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This pupillometry study examined the relationship between intelligence and creative cognition from
the resource allocation perspective. It was hypothesized that, during a creative metaphor task,
individuals with higher intelligence scores would have different resource allocation patterns than
individuals with lower intelligence scores. The study also examined the inﬂuence of intelligence in
language and visuo-spatial domains on the resource allocation mechanism of verbal and visual
creativity. The results suggested that individuals with higher intelligence scores allocated more
cognitive resources for creative tasks than those with lower intelligence scores but not for non-
creative tasks. The ﬁndings of this study support the view that creativity requires allocation of several
cognitive faculties and may share underlying cognitive and neural mechanisms with intelligence.
Domain-speciﬁc intelligence did not seem to play a signiﬁcant role in the samedomain, as individuals
with higher scores in both domains showed similar resource allocation patterns.However, individuals
with higher intelligence scores in the visuo-spatial domain generated more creative metaphorical
interpretations in both verbal and visual creativemetaphor tasks suggesting its importance in creative
cognition.
The relationship between intelligence and creative cognition has
beenwidely debated and still remains a controversial issue in the
psychology of creativity (Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009). Most
scholars maintain that creativity and intelligence are distinct
abilities with small overlap (Kaufman & Plucker, 2011; Runco,
2007). Some research has suggested that creative cognition,
usually measured with divergent thinking tasks, covaries mod-
estly with intelligence (Kim, 2005; Silvia, 2008). However,
many contemporary researchers have also argued that there are
good reasons to expect stronger relationships between intelli-
gence and creative cognition as both engage similar cognitive
functions (Silvia, 2015). Generating creative ideas that are both
novel and appropriate requires identifying and implementing
strategies for idea generation as well as exerting control over
attention and thought (Vartanian, 2009)—making decisions to
reﬁne initial ideas (Cheng, Hu, Jia, & Runco, 2015; Vartanian,
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2009), and weeding out obvious and irrelevant ideas (Smith,
Ward, & Schumacher, 1993).
In this regard, an alternative and novel way to study the
relationship between intelligence and creativity is to determine
the difference in cognitive resource allocation patterns of indi-
viduals with varying intelligence scores when they perform
creative tasks. Here, resources are deﬁned as the amount of
activation available for information storage and processing in
the underlying cortical neural system. This pool of resources is
assumed to be limited and dependent on (a) neurotransmitter
functioning, (b) metabolic system supporting the neural system,
and (c) the structural connectivity of the neural system (Just,
Carpenter, & Miyake, 2003).
Though there are only a few resource-allocation studies on
creativity (Fink & Benedek, 2014), such studies have played a
major role in illuminating the mechanism of intelligence and
differentiating between the cognitive processes of individuals
with higher and lower intelligence (Lee, Ojha, Kang, & Lee,
2015; Neubauer& Fink, 2009; VanDerMeer et al., 2010). It has
been argued that variation within the availability of resources
and their allocation mechanism are the primary basis for the
individual differences in intelligence. Several hypotheses have
been proposed in this regard to explain the resource allocation
patterns of individuals with higher intelligence, as compared to
those with lower intelligence. For instance, the neural efﬁciency
hypothesis suggests that individuals with higher intelligence
allocate fewer resources but use them efﬁciently (Ahern &
Beatty, 1979). In contrast, resource hypothesis proposes that
individuals with higher intelligence have extra resources to
allocate for a task (Van Der Meer et al., 2010).
Creative cognition, similar to intelligence, also requires allo-
cation of cognitive resources. Although the prevalent view sug-
gests that creative insights are intuitive and spontaneous (Shirley
& Langan-Fox, 1996), several researchers have argued that
creativity requires a deliberate and methodological problem-
solving strategy (e.g., Gardner, 1988; Guilford, 1982;
Sternberg, 2006), which includes various executive functions
such as working memory, perception, attention, etc. (Weisberg,
1993). This view is further supported by the brain imaging
studies (Katz, 1997), and the cognitive framework proposed by
Dietrich (2004) on the neural basis of creativity,which suggests a
common underlying neural mechanism for both intelligence and
creativity. Therefore, considering that (a) both intelligence and
creativity requires consumption of resources and (b) intelligent
individuals have different ways of allocating them for a task, it is
possible to hypothesize that intelligent individualsmay also have
different resource allocation strategies for creative and non-
creative tasks. The similarity or differences in resource allocation
patterns can further illuminate the relationship between intelli-
gence and creative cognition. Consequently, the ﬁrst goal of this
study was to explore the resource allocation patterns of indivi-
duals with higher and lower intelligence scores when they
performed creative and non-creative tasks.
The second goal of this study was to understand the domain-
speciﬁc creativity and its relation with the resource-allocation
patterns of individuals with varying intelligence scores in the
same domain. Generally, it has been argued that higher-level
cognitive processes are not domain speciﬁc, i.e., a creative
person in one domain (e.g., verbal) tends to be creative in another
domain (e.g., visual). For example, according to Simonton’s
hierarchical model, creativity varies on a single dimension
(Simonton, 2009). In contrast, some researchers have argued
that creativity depends mainly on domain-speciﬁc skills (Silvia,
Kaufman, & Pretz, 2009). According to this view, visuo-spatial
abilities appear to be most important for visual creativity. It must
be noted here that domain-speciﬁc intelligence is a well-
researched issue in educational psychology (Petsche, 1996;
Vitouch, Bauer, Gittler, Leodolter, & Leodolter, 1997): studies
have shown that individuals allocate resources differently in
different domains according to the task type and complexity
(Lee et al., 2015). So considering this, it is possible that
domain-speciﬁc skills and intelligence play a signiﬁcant role in
the resource-allocation pattern in the creative tasks of the same
domain.
However, to analyze this relationship from a resource-alloca-
tion perspective, three methodological issues need to be consid-
ered. First is to decide on ameasure of intelligence, as it is highly
controversial. Researchers have argued that measuring intelli-
gencewith a single score is not enough or justiﬁed (Neisser et al.,
1996), and individuals have different intelligence potentials in
different domains. In this study, intelligence was measured in
two domains, namely language and visuo-spatial. The second
issue is associated with the assessment of resource allocation. In
this regard, different measures of activity as indices of resource
allocation have been veriﬁed (Just et al., 2003). Among these,
the most common is the assessment of pupil dilation. Research
has shown that the pupil dilates more when the processing
demand is higher. Pupil dilation also indicates sustained infor-
mation processing, preparation (Granholm, Asarnow, Sarkin, &
Dykes, 1996), complex-stimuli interpretation (Beatty, 1982),
deception (Wang, Spezio, & Camerer, 2010), and affective
processing partially connected with creativity (Partala &
Surakka, 2004). Hence, in this study, pupil dilation was taken
to be a measure of resource allocation. Finally, the last issue is
related to creative tasks. For this study, creative verbal and visual
metaphor taskswere chosen, as they constitute good examples of
real-world creativity (Lubart & Getz, 1997; Sanchez-Ruiz,
Santos, & Jiménez, 2013; Seitz, 1997). Moreover, metaphors
provide instances of creativity not only in speech and written
text, but also in images and other modalities (Forceville, 2006;
Indurkhya & Ojha, 2013; Kennedy, 1982).
METHOD
Participants
Forty-ﬁve high school students (21 girls and 24 men), with a
mean age of 21 years (SD = 1.7) from universities around Seoul,
South Korea, participated in the study. Their participation was
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voluntary. All participants were right-handed as assessed by the
Edinburgh handedness inventory (Oldﬁeld, 1971), and had nor-
mal or corrected-to-normal vision. They had no reported history
of neurological or psychiatric diseases. All the participants were
ﬂuent in English (based on their TOEIC scores). It was also
conﬁrmed that participants were not taking any medications.
Pretest
Before the actual experiment, all the participants went through a
pretest to determine their level of intelligence in language and
visuo-spatial domains. For this, the standardKorean intelligence
test (developed by Korea Employment Information Service in
2003) was chosen, which measures several aspects of intelli-
gence through questions related to different domains of intelli-
gence such as language, mathematics, visuo-spatial, etc. The test
included 238 questions and participants were given a positive
score for each correct answer.
Stimulus Material
Two sets of stimuli, verbal and visual, were prepared for this
study.
Verbal stimuli
A total of 36 sentences (12 metaphors, 12 literals, and 12
anomalous) from the work of Shibata, Abe, Terao, and
Miyamoto (2007) were chosen as the verbal stimuli. The sen-
tences were in simple “X is Y” format (e.g., Literal: “A dolphin
is an animal;” “A crow is a bird.” Metaphor: “Education is
stairs;” “Smile is a ﬂower.” Anomalous: “Milk is pajamas;”
“The star is a curry.”).
Visual stimuli
Visual stimuli were created in two steps. In the ﬁrst step,
two sets of images (200) were taken from Internet. The ﬁrst
set included 100 normal and congruous scenes depicting
nature, cities, classrooms, etc. and the second set included
100 incongruous images that could be interpreted meta-
phorically. The luminance and contrast levels of the images
were digitally equated using the Adobe Photoshop software.
Then these 200 images were shown to 13 participants, who
were asked to rate them on the following two dimensions:
(a) understandability and (b) ﬁgurativeness. Each image was
presented on the screen and the participants were asked to
press the spacebar when they decided on its understandabil-
ity and ﬁgurativeness. This brought them to the next screen,
where they were asked to rate the image. First they were
asked to rate the understandability of the image on a scale of
0–5 (0 = least meaningful; 5 = very meaningful). Then they
were asked to rate the ﬁgurativeness of the image on a scale
of 0–5 (0 = literal; 5 = highly metaphorical). Both sets of
images were presented randomly on an online portal.
In the second step, the ratings of all the participants were
averaged for each of the two dimensions. Twelve images that
were rated high on meaningfulness (average: 4.1) and high on
ﬁgurativeness (average: 4.6) were chosen as metaphor images.
Twelve images thatwere rated high onmeaningfulness (average:
4.8) and low on ﬁgurativeness (average: 0.7) were chosen as
literal images. Also, 12 images that were rated low on both
meaningfulness (average: 0.6) and ﬁgurativeness (average: 0.3)
were chosen as anomalous images (see Figure 1). This study
used complex images to tap more heavily into semantic system
(Jouen et al., 2015). Apart from this, 12 control visual stimuli
were also prepared for the visual condition.
Pupil Baseline Task
This was a calibration procedure prior to any task instructions to
obtain the baseline pupil size of the participants. The baseline
data were also used to remove the effect of stimulus-related
intensity (luminance), gaze angle, and adaptation time-response
of pupillary light reﬂex to variation in intensity (Jang,
Mallipeddi, Lee, Kwak, & Lee, 2014). Participants were asked
to ﬁxate on a plus (+) sign, presented ﬁve times for 10 sec. The
duration between the ﬁxations was 10 sec. The individual aver-
age pupil diameter during the 10 sec of ﬁxation was taken as the
pupil baseline, not inﬂuenced by any instructional and expecta-
tion effects. The baseline task was conducted before the presen-
tation of each block.
Procedure and Data Acquisition
Participants were called and seated in a comfortable chair in a
dimly lit (luminance 180 ± 20 lux) and sound-attenuated
FIGURE 1 Examples of visual stimuli (a) control image, (b) literal image, (c) metaphorical image, (d) anomalous image.
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chamber. An eye-tracker (Tobii 1750) was used to record the
pupil variation and the response time while the participants
performed creative metaphor interpretation task. Stimuli were
presented on a 21-inch screen monitor (1280 × 1024). The
distance between the participants and the screen was around
60–80 cms. At the beginning of the experiment, participants
ﬁlled out a questionnaire that ascertained demographic data, as
well as factors known to affect pupil dilation (e.g., psychiatric
and neurological dysfunction, drug consumption, medication).
Then they were calibrated on the Tobii eye tracker and their
baseline data were collected before the presentation of each
block. For the actual experiment, in the verbal run, 12 sen-
tences (four literals, four metaphorical, and four anomalous)
were presented in three blocks. For the visual run, 16 images
(four literal images, four metaphorical images, four anomalous
images, and four control images) were presented in three
blocks. There was a gap of 10 sec between consecutive stimuli.
The stimuli in each block were presented randomly, but were
the same for all participants. Order of the block was decided
beforehand. Stimuli were presented in blocks to reduce the
participants’ fatigue and order effect.
Participants were instructed to decide if the given sentence or
image was literal, metaphorical, or anomalous (noncomprehen-
sible). They were explicitly instructed to “be creative” (e.g., Niu
& Liu, 2009). They were also instructed to press the space bar to
go to the next stimulus if they did not want to answer, the
stimulus changed after 10 sec and a new stimulus appeared.
The overall experiment took around 20~25 min, though there
were some variations among individual participants (±10 min).
Once the participants ﬁnished the experiment, they were shown
again the stimuli they categorized as metaphorical, and were
asked to interpret each stimulus. Their oral responses were
recorded and later transcribed for analyzing the level of creativ-
ity in interpretations.
Task
Interpreting creative metaphors was considered to be the crea-
tive task in this experiment. Different metaphors tasks have
been proposed in the literature such as simile insertion, simile
completion, metaphor completion, etc. (De Barros, Primi,
Miguel, Almeida, & Oliveira, 2010). However, one method,
used mostly in neuroscience research, is metaphor interpreta-
tion task. In this task, a sentence is given, and the participants
are asked to decide if it is literal, metaphorical, or anomalous
(Indurkhya & Ojha, 2013; Shibata et al., 2007). If the partici-
pant decides that the sentence is metaphorical, then she or he is
asked to provide an interpretation for it. In this study, the
metaphor interpretation task was used for two reasons. First,
it was assumed that it distinguishes between the processes
involved in literal, metaphorical and anomaly interpretation.
Second, this study used visual modalities, and if the study
used, for example, metaphor completion task for visual
images, then the quality of answer would depend on the
drawing ability of the participant.
Creative Task Scoring
Irrespective of the stimulus precategorization, the partici-
pants’ responses were categorized into metaphorical, literal,
and anomalous. Five raters (graduate students conducting
research on psychology of creativity) judged each metaphor
independently: they were not given any information about
the scoring of the other raters or about the participants and
their response to other metaphors. Each metaphor was
assigned a random number, and then all metaphors were
sorted in the numerical order. The raters scored each meta-
phor on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all creative; 5 = very
creative). Scorers were given the pointers such as: Is the
interpretation interesting, funny, striking, etc.? A ﬁnal score
of creativity was assigned to each interpretation based on
the inter-rater agreement (KAPPA 0.78, p < .01).
Data Organization and Analysis
Behavioral data (response times) was analyzed using the
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). Pupillary
response was analyzed using Matlab 7.1 and statistical software
(SPSS). Artifacts due to excessive blinking were removed. Very
small blinks (less than 3 sec) were replaced by linear interpola-
tion. Pupil size can also be effected by external factors like the
luminance of stimulus, gaze angles, etc. To remove these effects,
the data were processed using the methods of Jang et al. (2014)
and Lee et al. (2015). To represent the change in pupil size,
adjustments were made for the fact that the pupil size varies for
individuals. To compensate for individual variations, pupil size
in the baseline task was used as the standard. The experimental
pupil data were calculated, and change in the pupil size was
represented as a percentage of the baseline pupil size (Lee et al.,
2015).
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
The response time was calculated for the participants in both the
verbal and the visual tasks. In the verbal condition, the partici-
pants took longer to interpret the metaphorical (6.09 sec) and the
anomalous sentences (6.10 sec) than the literal sentences
(4.41 sec). A one-way ANOVA revealed that the difference
was signiﬁcant F(2,88) = 5.67, p < .01. Similarly, in the visual
condition, the participants took longer to interpret the metapho-
rical (5.48 sec) and the anomalous images (7.34 sec) than the
literal images (3.45 sec). A one-way ANOVA revealed that the
difference was signiﬁcant F(2,88) = 3.59, p < .05 (Figure 2).
Pupil Response
The pupil-size variation in literal, metaphor, and anomaly
conditions was analyzed as a percentage of the baseline
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pupil size, after removing the noise based on the methods
applied by Jang et al. (2014) and Lee et al. (2015).
Separate linear regression models were created for verbal
and visual conditions. In the linear regression, continuous
scores (0–248) in both the language and visuo-spatial
domains were taken to be the independent variable. The
change in the pupil-size diameter (as a percentage of the
baseline pupil size) was considered to be the dependent
variable to measure the allocation of cognitive resources.
Verbal condition
For the verbal condition, both language and visuo-spatial
scores were found to be signiﬁcant predictors of the pupil size
during metaphorical and anomalous interpretations. Language
score was not found to be a signiﬁcant predictor of the pupil size
in the literal task. Overall, as the intelligence scores in language
and visuo-spatial domains increased, the pupil size also
increased in the creative metaphor interpretation task but not in
the literal interpretation task (Table 1).
Visual condition
Similar results were found in the visual condition.
Intelligence scores of language and visuo-spatial intelligence
scores were signiﬁcant predictors of the pupil size during the
metaphorical and anomalous interpretations but not during the
literal interpretation. In general, the pupil size increased during
the metaphorical and anomalous interpretations as the intelli-
gence scores increased (Table 2).
The correlation between the creativity and intelligence scores
in both the verbal and visual domain was assessed using the
Pearson’s r measure (Table 3). It was found that the creativity
scores were positively correlated with the intelligence scores of
visuo-spatial domain in the verbal condition, and with both the
scores in the visual condition.
DISCUSSION
Individuals with higher intelligence scores showed a signiﬁcant
increase in the size of pupil diameter during creative verbal and
visual metaphor interpretations, but not during the literal inter-
pretations. As discussed earlier, an increase in the pupil size
during stimulus processing indicates sustained information-pro-
cessing load (Hyona, Tommola and Alaja, 1995) as well as
allocation of resources (Beatty, 1982; Van Der Meer et al.,
2010). Increased pupil size also indicates preparation (Lee
et al., 2015; Sirevaag et al., 1999) and attention (Hoeks &
Levelt, 1993). Conﬁrming the ﬁrst hypothesis, the results
showed that the resource allocation mechanism is different for
individuals with different intelligence scores while performing
the creative and noncreative tasks. Individuals with higher intel-
ligence scores seem to allocate more cognitive resources to
process information needed for creative tasks and fewer
resources for noncreative tasks. They also appear to allocate
more preparatory and attention resources for creative tasks
than individuals with lower intelligence scores. This result also
supports the view that creative insights result from preparation,
deliberation and focused attention, all of which requires alloca-
tion of various cognitive resources. It must be noted that these
features of information processing also characterize information
processing during intelligence tasks. A similar pattern for the
individuals with high intelligence scores in intelligence tasks
FIGURE 2 Response times in metaphor, literal and anomaly conditions
for visual and verbal tasks.
TABLE 1
Standard Multiple Regressions of intelligence scores in language and
visuo-spatial on change in pupil size in various conditions
Condition Predictors β t N df F R2
Literal 43 2 3.74* .14
Language −0.01 −1.62
Visuo-spatial .02 1.62
Metaphor 43 2 37.30* .63
Language .03 2.95*
Visuo-spatial .07 3.51**
Anomaly 43 2 56.92** .72
Language .15 4.43***
Visuo-spatial .08 2.31*
*p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
TABLE 2
Standard Multiple Regressions of intelligence scores in language and
visuo-spatial on change in pupil size in various conditions
Conditions Predictors β t N df F R2
Literal 43 2 1.21 .05
Language −0.02 −1.43
Visuo-spatial .02 1.50
Metaphor 43 2 72.36*** .77
Language .14 4.38***
Visuo-spatial .11 3.26**
Anomaly 43 2 69.61*** .76
Language .09 4.17***
Visuo-spatial .07 3.23**
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and creative tasks suggests that the underlying neural mechan-
ism may be the same, and creative cognition and intelligence
may be closely associated.
It was also hypothesized that the domain-speciﬁc intelli-
gence plays a signiﬁcant role in the resource allocation
patterns during creative tasks in the same domain. In other
words, individuals with high intelligence scores in language
were hypothesized to perform better in the creative verbal-
metaphor task and individuals with high intelligence scores
in the visuo-spatial domain were hypothesized to perform
better in the creative visual-metaphor task. The results sug-
gest that individuals with high intelligence scores in the
visuo-spatial domain generated more creative interpretations
for both verbal and visual metaphors. However, it was also
found that individuals with higher intelligence scores in
both domains showed similar changes in the size of pupil
diameter. This suggests that both groups allocated similar
cognitive resources for creative tasks. So there was no
difference between highly intelligent individuals in the lan-
guage and visuo-spatial domains from the resource alloca-
tion perspective. But individuals with higher intelligence
scores in the visuo-spatial domain performed better in
terms of creative interpretation.
Individuals with higher intelligence scores in the visuo-spa-
tial domain generated highly creative interpretations in verbal
condition but not in the visual condition. This ﬁnding is con-
sistent with the notion that visual creativity is largely domain and
task speciﬁc, whereas verbal creativity, even though mostly
domain speciﬁc, may, to some extent, be sensitive to processes
in the visual domain as well (Palmiero et al., 2011). One possible
explanation in relation to metaphorical creativity is that verbal
metaphors were not presented in any context. Participants were
allowed to imagine any context and situation to render them
meaningful. Some studies have shown that readers generate
better and more creative interpretations if they have good ima-
gination or if they are allowed to imagine a context themselves
(Indurkhya, 2007, 2016; Kövecses, 2009). Visual metaphors
were also presented without any context, but visual features of
these metaphors could have provided the context implicitly,
thereby restricting the participants from making distant concep-
tual associations (Forceville & Urios-Aparisi, 2009; Mitchell,
1995; Ojha & Indurkhya, 2016). Moreover, notions of highly
creative and less creative interpretations are somewhat subjec-
tive: They are qualitative in nature, and there is no universally
agreed criterion to determine the quality of creativity (Cropley,
2000). This is particularly so for metaphors, where an
association needs to be created between the source and the
target: Any posited connection between the source and target,
however novel, is not necessarily considered to be creative by
different people. It must also be noted that intelligence in the
visuo-spatial domain has been shown to be associated with
creative reasoning and imagery (Silvia & Beaty, 2012; Sligh,
Conners, & Roskos‐Ewoldsen, 2005).
A signiﬁcant increase in the pupil size was also observed
during the interpretation of verbal and visual anomalous
stimuli for individuals with higher intelligence scores in
both domains. This suggests that interpreting an anomalous
stimulus requires additional resources similar to interpreting
a metaphor. This ﬁnding provides support for the creative
metaphor comprehension process suggested by the prag-
matic model of metaphor processing. In the standard prag-
matic model (Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989; Glucksberg, 1991), it is
claimed that metaphorical interpretation is a two-step pro-
cess: ﬁrst an attempt to understand the stimuli literally, and
then to interpret it metaphorically. The model suggests that
after failing to arrive at a literal interpretation, additional
effort is made to ﬁnd another interpretation for the see-
mingly anomalous stimulus. If the effort is successful, a
ﬁgurative meaning is attempted and if the process fails
again, the stimulus is rendered anomalous. Increased pupil
dilation for both verbal and visual anomalous stimuli may
indicate an attempt to ﬁnd alternative interpretations and
allocation of extra resources in the process.
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